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LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS UNDER THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1976
jUD1TH LIDSKY*
The revision of Internal Revenue Code section 2039' by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976 2 expanded the sources from which distributions may
qualify for estate tax exclusion; at the same time, it circumscribed the form
of' distribution that will be excluded. 3 The resulting trade-off between in-
come and estate tax benefits complicates the already difficult process of
selecting among distribution options from a qualified pension plan.' Be-
cause it. is almost impossible to anticipate the optimum choice at. the time an
estate or pension plan is drafted, especially in the case of a pension plan
where the document. must. accommodate a variety of interests, the planner
must focus seriously on the problem of whom to designate as the ultimate
decision-maker. Fiduciary liability under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 5 and ambiguities in the language of section
2039, in the absence of regulations, intensify the complexities.
This article attempts to respond in a practical way to these issues. Part
I describes the amendment to section 2039; Part 11 analyzes some of the
competing interpretations of when the estate tax exclusion is available; Part
III outlines the relative merits of lump sum distributions and other pay-
ment options; and Part IV offers and assesses some tentative approaches to
immediate estate and pension planning problems.
I. THE AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2039
A. Eligible Distribution Sources
The amendments to section 2039 have expanded the distribution
sources eligible for estate tax exclusion. Under section 2039(c), Exemption of
Annuities Under Certain Trusts and Plans, amounts paid to a beneficiary other
than the decedent's executor from specified retirement plans or programs
are excludible from the decedent's estate in the proportion that contribu-
* B.A., Cornell University, 1958; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1961; Member of Massachu-
setts Bar; Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, Boston, Massachusetts.
' All referenceS, unless otherwise identified, shall be to the internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended.
2 Tax RefOrm Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stu. 455.
3 As a general rule, survivor annuities are includible in the gross estate of the decedent.
Section 2039(c) and (b) require the inclusion in the gross estate of the value of any annuity or
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any
form of contract or agreement (other than insurance) if, under such contract or agreement (1)
an annuity or other payment was payable to the decedent, or (2) the decedent possessed the
right to receive such annuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction with another for his
life or for any period which cannot be ascertained without reference to his death or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death. See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDonEt. &
H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 442-43 (1977). Although I.R.C. § 2039
applies both to survivor annuities payable as an employee death benefit and to annuities that
are not employment related, cases most often involve employment situations. Id.
"Qualified pension plan" or simply, "qualified plan" shall mean any plan or program
from which distributions are, in appropriate circumstances, excludible under I.R.C. § 2039(c).
Any account, annuity, or bond covered by LR.C. § 2039(e) shall be referred to merely as an
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 el seq, (Supp. IV 1974).
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dons to the plan or program came from the employer. Prior to amend-
ment, the exclusion was specifically denied to contributions on behalf of the
self-employed, since the employer, for purposes of section 2039(c), was also
the employee. The Tax Reform Act extends the exclusion to certain distri-
butions from Keogh plans and, by adding new section 2039(e), from indi-
vidual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities.' Except in
the case of IRAs, the exclusion is still not available to payments or contribu-
tions under such programs made by or deemed to have been made by the
decedent. However, for the first time, employer contributions to Keogh
plans are deemed not to have been made by the decedent and therefore
are afforded the exclusion.
B. Eligible Distribution Types
In addition to expanding the sources of distribution eligible for es-
tate tax exclusion, the amended statute also eliminates the exclusion in all
cases in which the otherwise qualifying distribution is receivable as a lump
sum distribution. Specifically, section 2039(c) now provides that not-
withstanding any other provision of law, for estates of decedents dying
after December 31, 1976,
there shall be excluded from the gross estate the value of an an-
nuity or other payment (other than a lump sum distribution described
Keogh plans, also known as H.R. 10 plans, are private pension or profit sharing plans
established by an unincorporated proprietorship or partnership to cover its employees, includ-
ing the self-employed proprietor or partner. Prior to the revision made by section 2009(c)(2)
of the Tax Reform Act, I.R.C. § 2039(c) provided: "For purposes of this subsection, contribu-
tions or payments on behalf of the decedent while he was an employee within the meaning of
section 401(c)(1) made under a trust or plan described in paragraph (I) or (2) shall be consid-
ered to be contributions or payments made by the decedent." The revised section substitutes
the following sentence:
For purposes of this subsection, contribution or payments on behalf of the dece-
dent while he was an employee within the meaning of section 401(c)(I) made
under a trust or plan described in paragraph (1) or (2) shall to the extent allow-
able as a deduction under section 404, be considered to be made by a person
other than the decedent and, to the extent not so allowable, shall be considered
to be made by the decedent.
IRAs, see note 4 supra, are created with the tax-deductible contributions of an indi-
vidual who receives compensation but who is not an "active participant" in his or her employ-
er's plan. I.R.C. §§ 219, 408(a), 408(b), and 409. Under I.R.C. § 220, a so-called "spousal IRA"
may be set up for or by such an employee's spouse, even though such spouse receives no
compensation from an employer. "Rollover I RAs" are tax-free transfers of otherwise taxable
distributions from certain qualified plans and other IRAs; they are governed by the provisions
of I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5) and (6), and 403(a)(4) and (5).
Section 2009(c)(1) of the Tax Reform Act added section 2039(e) to the Code. This pro-
vision provides an exclusion of the value of "an annuity receivable by any beneficiary (other
than the executor) under (I) an individual retirement account described in section 408(a), (2)
an individual retirement annuity, described in section 408(b) or (3) a retirement bond de-
scribed in section 409(a)."
Except in the case of rollover amounts, the subsection (e) exclusion extends only to
amounts allowed under I.R.C. § 219 as a deduction for retirement savings.
Section 3(j)(i) and 3(a) of the Technical Corrections Bill, H.R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess, (1977), if enacted, would provide that annuities paid from spousal IRAs also may qualify
for the estate tax exclusion.
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in section 402(e)(4), determined without regard to the next to the last
sentence of section 402(e)(4)(A) receivable by any beneficiary
(other than the executor) under
a section 401(a) trust (or contract purchased by such trust), a section 403(a)
annuity plan, a section 403(b) plan, or the government-sponsored "Retired
Servicemen's Family Protection Plan."'
To be excludible under section 2039(e) however, payments must take
the form of an annuity, specifically defined for purposes of such subsection
in the last sentence thereof as "an annuity contract or other arrangement
providing for a series of substantially equal periodic payments to be made
to the beneficiary (other than the executor) for his life or over a period ex-
tending for at least 36 months after the date of the decedent's death."
Notably, the subsection (e) definition of "annuity" differs from the
pre-amendment description of an annuity. Pursuant to the regulations
under section 2039, an annuity included any distribution that was not a
single sum, whether paid within one taxable year or otherwise, viz., 'one or
more payments, extending over any period of time. The payments may be
equal or unequal, conditional or unconditional, periodic or sporadic."'" To
be sure, if this definition still obtained for section 2039(e) purposes, the
available distribution options under a subsection (e) annuity would be
greater than those available under a subsection (c) lump sum distribution
from a qualified plan. Some adjustment to accommodate the difference was
therefore needed. No explanation, however, has been given as to why the
payment structures applicable to subsection (e) are less liberal than are
those in subsection (c). Perhaps new regulations will clarify the extent of
the applicability of the new definition, and explain its purpose.
11. AVAILABILITY OF THE EXCLUSION
A. Tax Benefit Theory or Liquidity Theory
Putting aside for the moment a discussion of when the exclusion
ought to be chosen and disregarding the question of who should be as-
signed the responsibility of electing the payment option under a qualified
plan, consideration must be given to whether the mere payment as a lump
Emphasis supplied to indicate the words added by section 2009(c)(3) of the Tax Re-
form Act.
" Paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of I.R.C. § 2039(c) read:
( I) An employees' trust (or under a contract. purchased by an employees'
trust) forming part of a pension, stock bonus, or profit-sharing plan which,
at the time of the decedent's separation from employment (whether by
death or otherwise), or at the time of termination of the plan if earlier,
met the requirements of section 401(a);
(2) A retirement annuity contract purchased by an employer (and not by an
employees' trust) pursuant to a plan which, at the time of decedent's sep-
aration from employment (by death or otherwise), or at the time of termi-
nation of the plan if earlier, was a plan described in section 403(a);
(3) A retirement annuity contract purchased for an employee by an employer
which is an organization referred to in section 170(b) (1)(A)(ii) or (vi), or
which is a religious organization (other than a trust), and which is exempt
from tax under section 501(a); or
(4) Chapter 73 of title 10 of the United States Code.
" Treas. Reg. §20.2039-1(b), T.D. 7416, 41 F.R. 14514 (1976).
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sum automatically precludes the estate tax exclusion, or whether the exclu-
sion remains available in the absence of an affirmative election—pursuant
to section 402(e)(4)(B)"—to apply the separate income tax made applicable
to a portion of a lump sum distribution by section 402(e)(1).
The cause of the controversy is the language that extends the exclu-
sion to distributions "other than a lump sum distribution described in sec-
tion 402(e)(4)." This would seem to require that the (e)(4)(B) election must
be made before the exclusion is lost, despite quasi-official statements dis-
cussed below indicating that the purpose of the exclusion was to relieve II-
liquid estates. The ambiguity is unresolved as of this writing.
The actual "description" of a lump sum distribution appears in section
402(e)(4)(A), which provides that the term "lump sum distribution" from
plans that "qualify" under section 401(a) or 403(a) means "the distribution
or payment within one taxable year of the recipient of the balance to the
credit of an employee which becomes payable to the recipient" in specified
circumstances.' 2
Although perhaps only the foregoing description was considered by
Congress, the reference in 2039(c) is, nevertheless, to "(e)(4)" as a whole,
and technically, the (e)(4)(B) election is encompassed. This inclusion may
have been intentional, in light of the fact that although a modifying phrase
appears in section 2039(c) with respect to disregarding the next to the last
sentence of section 402(e)(4)(A), no such qualifier was added in respect of
(e)(4)(B). Further, there is no such thing as a "lump sum distribution de-
scribed in section 402(e)(4)" in respect of distributions cited in paragraphs
(3) and (4) of section 2039(c). Thus, for example, a distribution under a
conventional section 403(b) contract will qualify for the section 2039(c) ex-
clusion even if a single sum is paid. However, although gearing the exclu-
sion to income tax treatment is consistent with the proposition that only
payments that receive income tax benefits should be made to sacrifice the
estate tax exclusion, it is inconsistent with the congressional report" and
" 1.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(13) provides, in pertinent part, that, except for an annuity contract,
no amount may be treated as a lump sum distribution under subparagraph (A) "unless the
taxpayer elects for the taxable year to have all such amounts received during such year so
treated ...." After the annuitant attains age 59 1/2 only one such election may be made. The
consequences flowing from this rule are discussed in Cook & Adkins, Some Considerations in the
Impact of ERISA on Estate Planning, T.M.C.J. 76-11 (November 1976) [hereinafter Cook & Ad-
kins]. It should be remembered that a self-employed individual who does not make an election
under (e)(4)(13) cannot receive for income tax purposes capital gains treatment for any portion
of the distribution, whereas for other individuals, such treatment is, in appropriate circum-
stances, automatic, unless under I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(L) the individual makes an election to treat
the entire distribution as ordinary income.
" Specifically, those circumstances are:
(i) on account of the employee's death, (ii) after the employee attains age 591/2,
(iii) on account of the employee's separation from service [but only if he or she is
not self-employed within the meaning of section 401(c)(I)), or (iv) after the employee
has become disabled [but only if he or she is self-employed].
1.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A). The explanation of clauses (iii) and (iv) contains greater detail than need
be reproduced here; instead, emphasis has been supplied to indicate the applicability of the
clauses.
It should be noted, however, that section 402(e)(4)(H), which requires five years of ser-
vice for the lump sum rules to apply, pertains to employees but not to their beneficiaries.
" H.R. REP. No. 95-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 624-25, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4262-63 [hereinafter H. REP.].
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the General Explanation of the Act, issued after the Act was published,"
both of which suggest that the exclusion was offered because annuitants, as
opposed to single sum recipients, would lack the wherewithal to pay estate
tax. 15 The congressional report in discussing the availability of the exclu-
sion to distributions from an individual retirement account, states that
"[g]enerally, the exclusion is to be available in situations where a liquidity
problem might exist because the schedule of payments to be made from
the account will not provide current funds to pay the estate tax."'"
The General Explanation stated under the heading, "Reasons for
Change":
The Congress, however believed that it is no longer appro-
priate to continue the estate tax exclusion with respect to
amounts payable in a single lump sum under a retirement plan.
Benefits paid in a lump sum will normally generate sufficient
cash to cover the estate tax liability attributable to the inclusion
of the benefits in the decedent's gross estate."
The position manifested by Internal Revenue Service rulings does not
lend support to this position. Specifically, the Service's view that the estate
tax exclusion is lost where a binding duty exists to use plan proceeds for es-
tate obligations can result in the paradoxical imposition of an estate tax on
estates only when they lack liquidity.' 8
All things considered, unless and until the regulations are issued
which implement congressional intent, it would seem that the estate tax
exclusion under section 2039(c) remains available for all distributions meet-
ing the (e)(4)(A) criteria, provided there is no (e)(4)(B) election.
B. The Word "Receivable": Problems of Constructive Receipt
Another troubling aspect of the amended section 2039 is the word
"receivable" and whether it has assumed a new significance in light of the
amendment's insertion before it of the parenthetical "(other than a lump
sum distribution)." Prior to the amendment, the word appeared in subsec-
tion (c) almost exactly as it does now in subsection (e); subsection (c) pro-
vided that "there shall be excluded from the gross estate the value of an
annuity or other payment receivable by any beneficiary (other than the
executor) under ..." specified types of qualified plans. The word's function
was 1) to introduce the issue of the kind of plan under which the distribu-
tion was made, 2) to raise the question of whether the beneficiary or the
decedent was the true recipient, and 3) to raise the question of whether
the beneficiary was, or should be considered to be, the executor.
' 4 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 592-93 (1976), reprinted in 76-2 C.B. 1, 604.05 [hereinafter General
Explanation). The General Explanation was not received by the tax committees and represents
only the staff's view of congressional intent. The Chief of Staff at the time was the late Law-
rence N. Woodworth, who at the time of his death in December, 1977 was Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy.
15 This view, of course, assumes that the beneficiary is liable for the estate tax.
' 6 H. REP.,supra note 13, at 624, reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE Cane.. & An. NEWS 4118,
4262. This language was carried over to the General Explanation, supra note 14, at 594, reprinted
in 76-2 C.B. 1, 606.
17 General Explanation, supra note 14, at 593, reprinted in 76-2 C.B. 1, 605.
18 See text at notes 26.28 infra.
535
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The insertion by the Tax Reform Act, immediately prior to the word
"receivable," of the parenthetical, "(other than a lump sum distribution),"
raises additional questions regarding the word's interpretation in cases
where the governing instrument of the plan does not preclude receipt of a
lump sum. Is the exclusion automatically lost when a lump sum distribution
may be elected by a plan fiduciary? By the participant? By a beneficiary? Is
the exclusion under subsection (c) automatically lost when the income tax
treatment of a lump sum distribution may be elected?
The original three functions of "receivable" have been the subjects of
considerable law. Under Regulation §20.2039-2, issued prior to the
amendment, examples (1) through (3) deal with identifying the distribution
as one from a qualified plan as contemplated by the statute, and example
(5) explains the applicability of section 2039(c) to section 403(b) plans. A
critical problem concerns when payment is receivable under a "contract
purchased by an employees' trust." The Tax Court has held that because
an annuity contract contained settlement options that were not in the plan,
once the contract was assigned to a retiree, it was no longer a "contract
purchased by an employees' trust" within the meaning of that term as used
in section 2039(c)." One of the concurring judges in this case relied instead
on the doctrine of constructive receipt, characterizing the proceeds as "a
mere savings arrangement, under which the cash surrender value of his re-
tirement contracts was held for him at interest." 20
Example (4) of Regulation § 20.2039-2 illustrates constructive receipt,
but again, only in a pre-amendment context, that of whether the amount
was receivable by the beneficiary or by the decedent. Under that example,
the decedent could have elected a lump sum at retirement but preferred an
arrangement under which he was paid interest only and his beneficiary re-
ceived the principal. The example determines that the proceeds were not
receivable by the beneficiary under a qualified plan, because the decedent,
through his ability to receive the sum, already had constructively received
it.
Similar situations have arisen under section 402, when a death has in-
tervened between a plan termination or other event triggering a distribu-
tion, and actual distribution. Although the development of the law of con-
structive receipt under sections 402 and 403 is beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion, it is nevertheless interesting to observe that a new context in which
constructive receipt questions are likely to arise is that in which a plan par-
ticipant dies during the period in which the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation is considering a request to approve a distribution because of
termination of the plan.
19
 Estate of Max Silverman v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 605, 617-18 (1974).
' 0 Id, at 624 (Hall, J., concurring). The problem of "constructive receipt' in the estate
tax area develops from the requirements of section 2039(c) and section 2039(e) that the an-
nuity receivable by a beneficiary be acquired tinder a qualified retirement plan. if the indi-
vidual covered by the plan has constructively received the plan benefits, then the beneficiary
receives the benefits not under the plan as required by section 2039(c), but directly from the
plan participant. Estate of Brooks v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 585 (1968). However, because the
constructive receipt doctrine was primarily developed in an income tax context, see, e.g., Cor-
liss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930), its applicability for purposes of section 2039(c) and (e) is
not yet settled. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANS-
FER TAXATION 465.67 (1977).
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With respect to the pre-amendment. issue of when a benefit that is not
directly payable to an estate is nonetheless considered receivable by the
executor, answers have been emerging on a piece-meal basis. 2 t As a starting
point, the rules set forth in Regulation § 20.2042-1(b), made applicable by
Regulation § 20.2039-2(b) to distributions under a qualified plan, provide,
in pertinent part:
If ... the proceeds are receivable by another beneficiary but are
subject to an obligation, legally binding on the other beneficiary,
to pay taxes, debts, or other charges enforceable against the es-
tate, then the amount of such proceeds requred for the payment
in full (to the extent of the beneficiary's obligation) of such taxes,
debts, or other charges is includible in the gross estate.
A 1973 Revenue Ruling decided that the exclusion was not lost if the
testamentary trustee was prohibited by the decedent's will from using plan
distributions for the estate's benefit. 22
 The ruling endorsed a position estab-
lished earlier that year in Korslin v. United States." There, constructive re-
ceipt was alleged because the decedent's trustee, who was the recipient of
plan proceeds, was empowered under the trust to satisfy a premarital
agreement. However, state law prohibited plan proceeds from being spent
for such obligations," and they were not so used.'
In a 1975 case, the Tax Court considered facts involving a plan distri-
bution to an inter vivos trust. 2° The decedent's will provided that certain
stock should not be sold by the estate unless other estate property proved
insufficient. to satisfy its obligations. In that instance, the trustees under the
will were authorized to sell the stock to the inter vivos trustees, who were
permitted, although not required, to lend funds to or buy property from
the estate. 27
 Both transactions, in fact., were completed.'" However, the
court concluded, citing Regulation § 20.2042, that the section 2039(c) ex-
clusion was not lost, in view of the absence of a binding obligation on the
trustee-beneficiary to pay obligations of the decedent's estate.'"
A revenue ruling issued last year stripped the word "receivable" of
much of its power in testamentary situations. 3° The ruling held that the
exclusion was applicable even though the trustee-recipient of plan proceeds
had been given discretion under the decedent's will to use trust funds to
satisfy the estate's obligations, so long as state law relieved such trustee of
any binding obligation to do so. 3 '
21
 For intensive discussions of this issue before and after recent legislation, see Metier,
Trust Recipient of Death Benefits Under a Qualified Retirement Plan—Section 2039(c), TAX NINCM7
(BNA) 74 - 15, 3, 3.7 (July 22, 1974); Mirarchi, Maintaining the Estate Tax Exclusion for Qualified
Plan Distributions, 116 'FR. & Es.r. 147, 147-49, 202-04 (1977).
22
 Rev. Rul. 73-404, 1972-2 C.B. 319.
23 31 AFTR 2d (P- H) 73-1437 (ED. Wis. 1973).
21
 WIS. STAT. §§ 231.49 and 272.18(30 (West 1957).
25
 Estate of Joseph E. Salisbury, 34 T.C.M, 1441 (CCH 1975).
26
 31 AFTR 2d (P-1-1) 73-1437 (ED, Wis. 1973).
27 1d. al 1454.
2"/d.
25 M. at 1455.
36
 Rev. Rul, 77-157, 1977-19 1.R.B. 23 (1977).
31 Id. al 24.
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In other situations, the extent to which constructive receipt will be
found is not known. There is still no answer to whether, and in what situa-
tions, amounts will be deemed receivable by an executor when state law
does allow the attachment of plan proceeds by creditors. Nor has there
been any decision as to what happens when a beneficiary designation fails
because it does not meet the requirements for executing testamentary doc-
uments in a state that applies such requirements to such designations. If a
state were not to recognize a beneficiary chosen by a method sanctioned
only by the plan, it might be argued that the amount could not be received
by that beneficiary and was therefore "receivable" by the executor. 32 Simi-
larly, there remains the rarely mentioned problem of whether instructions
that insurance proceeds are to be paid to the trustee of a qualified plan
constitute "designation of a beneficiary" as such. 33
Against this background, the amended statute raises an additional
constructive receipt question: whether the existence of a choice as to pay-
ment or tax treatment will foreclose the exclusion. Generally, post-mortem
elections are antithetical to the usual concept that estates are administered
as of the date of death. However, the General Explanation to the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, in amplification of the Congressional Committee Re-
ports, states:
Qualification for the estate tax exclusion is not affected by the
mere existence of a right in a party, such as the plan's benefits
committee, to select whether the benefits are paid in a lump sum
or as an annuity so long as the right to select is irrevocably exer-
cised no later than the earlier of the date the estate tax return is
filed, or the date on which the return is required to be filed (in-
cluding extension of time to file)."
The explanation is silent as to the effect of a right in a potential bene-
ficiary to make the election; that is, whether the existence of constructive
receipt for income tax purposes generates constructive receipt by the es-
tate.35 As matters now stand, if the plan provides that any choice made by a
beneficiary is conditioned upon approval by a plan fiduciary, constructive
receipt will probably be avoided on all counts, but care should be taken to
let the record show that administrative consideration is bona fide and ap-
proval neither discriminatory nor automatic. In any event, however, it is
hoped that regulations will formally indicate who may permissibly partici-
pate in making a plan election.
32 This problem should not arise in Massachusetts. MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch . 167, § 68
(West Stipp. 1976), effective January 18, 1977, exempts valid designations under qualified
plans from the usual requirements for making testamentary dispositions.
"CJ: Mirarchi, Maintaining the Estate Tax Exclusion for Qualified Plan Distributions, 116
TR. & EsT, 147, 202 (1977).
"General Explanation, supra note 14, at 594, reprinted in 76-2 C.B. I, 605.
as Since the text of the explanation in this paragraph is quite general, omissions are not
necessarily of significance. For example, a lump sum and an annuity are mentioned, and in-
stallment payments are not. Also, in discussing the selection between a lump sum and an an-
nuity, the explanation does not deal with whether for this purpose, the election of a distribu-
tion option and the election under (e)(4)(B) should be distinguished. It is possible that all of
these points will be clarified by regulations.
I.R.S. Letter Rul. 7817012 (January 24, 1978) applied § 2039(c) despite the beneficiary's
option to select a lump sum, because the actual distribution was not completed within one of
her taxable years.
538
LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS
Ill. RELATIVE MERITS OF VARIOUS DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS
Under present law, a lump sum distribution is taxed, roughly speak-
ing, as follows: For a section 402(e)(4)(A) lump sum from a corporate non-
contributory qualified plan, a part. of the distribution—in proportion to the
participant's period of plan membership completed before 1974—is taxable
as a capital gain," and the remainder is taxed in the normal manner for
ordinary income, unless an election under section 402(e)(4)(B) is made to
have the ordinary income portion specially taxed under section 402(e)(1).
That section, entitled Imposition of Separate Tax on Lump Sum Distri-
butions, provides a special averaging technique, designed to approximate
the tax payable on such an amount if it had been distributed over a ten-
year period. A Keogh plan participant's entire distribution is ordinary in-
come, taxed at the usual rate, unless the (e)(4)(B) election is made. If so
made, then the capital gains and the special averaging provisions apply. 37
Section 402(e)(4)(L) provides a further election to treat the entire distribu-
tion as ordinary income, subject to special averaging treatment.
Assuming the (e)(4)(B) election is included in section 2039(c)'s refer-
ence to a lump sum distribution, the decision to make or to forgo the elec-
tion must be tailored to the individual case. The size of the estate, the
availability of a marital deduction or a section 69I(c) deduction, as well as
the effect of state law, will be important considerations. Also to be taken
into account are pre- and post-1974 participation in the plan, the age of
the employee, 38
 the amount of plan proceeds, the existence of a minimum
distribution allowance, 39 and the availability of other forms of distributions.
Other circumstances that could affect the decision are almost limitless: for
example, the existence of life insurance,'" farm property,'" or closely-held
business property; ." the amount and nature of other income taxable to the
plan beneficiary; the liquidity needs of the estate and of individual ben-
eficiaries; and the value of any gifts made by the decedent. Finally, the
existence of a trust as beneficiary would warrant special consideration.
Only with all of this in mind can the following examination of alterna-
tives be read with perspective. A second caveat is, of course, that some of
the effects discussed are relevant to a choice made during the participant's
lifetime in contemplation of his or her retirement, while others will have
post-mortem impact only.
3" I.R.C. § 402(a)(2).
Id., last sentence.
"" A participant who has reached age 59V2 may make only one election under section
402(e)(4)(13). For a recent application of this rule, see Private Letter Ruling No. 7748053,
Internal Revenue Service, September 2, 1977.
" I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)(C) establishes that a minimum distribution allowance is deductible
from the total taxable amount of a plan distribution subject to the initial separate tax. This
minimum distribution allowance is described in 1.R.C. § 402(e)(I)(D). It is phased out as the
taxable amount increases, and is equal to zero when the amount reaches $70,000.
" Proceeds of life insurance contracts payable by reason of the insured's death gener-
ally are excludible from gross income of the beneficiary under I.R.C. § 101(a).
I.R.C. § 2032A provides special valuation of farm and real property for estate tax
p 'poses.
12
 I.R.C. § 303 affords capital gain rather than dividend treatment to specified distri-
butions in redemption of corporate stock where the corporation equals at least 50% of the
value of the gross estate of a decedent.
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A. Advantages of Selecting a Payment Option That Is Not a Lump Sum
Distribution
Evaluating the advantages of a distribution that is not a lump sum en-
tails two questions: the first is why the estate tax exclusion is desirable, and
the second is why, apart from the loss of the exclusion, a lump sum distri-
bution may lack attractiveness.
1. Reasons to Choose the Estate Tax Exclusion
a. Helpful to Large Estates. Periodic payments will produce an actual in-
come tax spread the absence of which special lump sum income tax bene-
fits were designed to approximate. The situation in which compensatory
income tax treatment would not be worth as much as the estate tax exclu-
sion is most likely to occur, of course, when the estate is in a high estate tax
bracket and the plan beneficiary is in a low income tax bracket. This
analysis assumes that if the plan beneficiary and the estate beneficiary are
different, their relationship is such that an overall tax saving will be to the
advantage of' both.
b. Greater Percentage Inclusion of Other Property. Certain income and es-
tate tax relief provisions afforded under the Code are conditioned upon
inclusion in the estate of a specified percentage of a particular type of
property. 43 The exclusion of plan proceeds raises the inclusion percentage
of these other kinds of property.
2. Disadvantages of Lump Sum Distribution Other Than the Loss of the
Estate Tax Exclusion
a. Loss of Sheltered Investment. The most commonly mentioned reason
for avoiding a distribution of an entire interest in a plan is that the after-
tax remainder of the distribution will no longer be tax-sheltered in a qual-
ified trust. 44 Clearly, the merits of this argument will depend upon the tax
consequences of the alternative investment options open to the recipient, as
well as upon nontax factors involved in the desire for immediate control of
the entire amount, such as the purchase of a retirement home or the
availability of a higher-yield investment.
b. Effect on Second Estate. If the beneficiary dies without disposing of
the sum, the amount will be included in a second estate.
c. Six-Year Aggregation. The advantages of lump sum tax treatment
may be eroded by the requirement that all lump - sum distributions—
including annuity contracts—made within a six-year period be aggregated
and included in computing the total - amount taxed as ordinary income. 45
The effect of this provision is to raise the rate of tax, although any tax pre-
viously paid is subtracted from the new amount due.
"3 See, note 42 supra, for example. In addition, sections 6166 and 6166A provide exten-
sions of time to pay tax when the estate consists largely of an interest in a closely held busi-
ness.
" Siegel, TRA: Impact on Pensions and ESOPs —Part II, 176 N.Y.L.J. 166 (1976).
45 1.R.C. § 402(e)(2). An annuity contract is includible under this Code section at the
"current actuarial value of the contract determined at the date of distribution," unreduced by
any employee investment in the contract partially allocated to "basis" according to T.I.R. 1315,
1974 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) T 6985A; see Cook & Adkins, supra note 1 I.
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The language of the Code is ambiguous as to treatment of a trust.
beneficiary for purposes of this aggregation. Under section 402(e)(2), a
beneficiary of a trust to which any such lump sum distribution has been
made is treated as the recipient if, under the rules of Subchapter J, he is
considered to be the grantor of the trust.. The beneficiary is also treated as
the recipient if he is an employee "with respect to the plan under which the
distribution is made." It seems obvious that, this was not intended to refer
to every employee in the plan, but only to the employee in respect of whom
the distribution under the plan was made; however, Proposed Regulation
*1.402(e)-2(e)(6) 4" merely adds that "the term, an employee with respect to
the plan under which the distribution is made', means an individual who,
immediately before the distribution is made, is a participant. in the plan
under which the distribution is made." Perhaps the final regulations will
redefine the term and indicate its significance.
d. Limited Income -Splitting Opportunities. Although liability for payment.
of the tax is apportioned, the tax on the ordinary income portion of a dis-
tribution to multiple recipients is computed as though the distribution were
made to a single recipient. 47
c. Uncertain Consequences qf Lump Sums for Trust Beneficiaries. Al-
though a trust to which the distribution is made is a "recipient" and can
elect lump sum treatment, it has not yet been made entirely clear that ben-
eficiaries to whom the trust distributes can escape income tax exposure. It
is probable that such exposure does not exist, because a trust beneficiary is
taxed under section 652 on distributable net income (DN I), and DNI is
based upon the trust's taxable income. Under section 402(e)(3), the ordi-
nary income portion subject to the separate tax is deductible from such
taxable income and therefore will not be involved in derivation of DNI.
This proposition appears to be acknowledged by the congressional state-
ment that:
If the lump sum distribution is made to a recipient other
than a trust during the employee's life time, it is intended that the
usual assignment-of-income and constructive receipt rules will
apply to determine whether the employee is to be liable for the
tax upon the distribution."
This language could be taken to mean that such rules do not apply if
the distribution were made to a trust. Further evidence of nontaxability at
the beneficiary level can be inferred from the omission of mention of ten-
year averaging in the proposed amendments to Regulation § I.652(b)-1
(and, by reference, to Regulation § 1.662(b)-1) if the omission is the result
of the belief that there is no need to deal with a tax that the beneficiaries
will never bear. On the other hand, it does not seem philosophically consis-
tent to continue to tax the beneficiaries on the capital gains portion, if any,
and to tax the trust on the ordinary income portion, unless it was intended
that the phase-out of capital gains treatment would eventually adjust this.
" 40 F.R. 22548 (1975).
§ 402(e)(2). See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.402(e)-2(e)(6); 	 1429, Rey.
Proc. 76-4, 76-1 C.B. 543 (1976),
" H. R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. Cook: CONG. & Au.
NEWS 5038, 5130 n.1 (emphasis added).
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Another unresolved issue regarding the consequences of lump sum
distributions to trust beneficiaries involves the effect of the second sentence
of' section 402(e)(2), which sentence, for six-year aggregation purposes,
identifies the "recipient" as the employee-beneficiary in certain cases. If this
sentence, when read in conjunction with section 402(e)(l)(E), which taxes
the "recipient" on the ordinary income portion, imposes the tax not on the
trust but on the employee-beneficiary, the result conflicts with the generally
accepted trust accounting rule that when a beneficiary receives a lump sum
distribution the amount is not income but corpus. Moreover, if the indi-
vidual is taxable under section 402(e)(1)(E), and he or she is a life benefi-
ciary only, state trust law may require the trustee to reimburse him or her
for having benefitted persons having an interest in the remainder. 49 In that
case, the tax burden would be transferred back to corpus, despite what sec-
tion 402(e) appears to require.
f. Unavailability of "Maxi- Tax." A lump sum distribution is not subject
to the fifty-percent maximum tax, because section 1348 (b)(1)(B) excludes
such sums from the definition of "personal service income.""
g. Unwanted Effect on Adjusted Gross Income. The deduction from gross
income of the ordinary income portion under section 402(e)(3) may be dis-
advantageous in certain circumstances. Ordinarily, if large losses or deduc-
tions exist, they may be used to offset ordinary income. Because of the
402(e)(3) deduction, the ordinary income portion of a lump sum cannot be
so sheltered, and therefore is fully taxable, albeit under the special provi-
sions of section 402(e)(I)(A).
The deduction also reduces for the year in which it is taken the
amount of deductible contributions to charity allowed under the provisions
of section 170, because deductibility increases with the size of the "contribu-
tion base," defined as adjusted gross income. 5 '
h. Imposition of Minimum Tax and 1976 Cure. Even prior to 1976, the
capital gains portion of a lump sum distribution constituted a tax prefer-
ence item under section 57, 5 ' to which the minimum tax of section 56
applied." The Tax Reform Act increased the minimum tax rate and thus
increased the cost of lump sum treatment. This seemed to contravene the
principle that lump sum distributions be favorably taxed. In recognition of
this, the Tax Reform Act attempted to restore a measure of flexibility in
the choice of distribution forms. This was done through the enactment of
section 402(e)(4)(L) which allows the taxpayer to elect to have his or her
pre-1974 participation in a plan treated as post-1973 participation. The en-
tire sum thus becomes ordinary income and because the capital gain ele-
ment disappears, no tax preference item is created, and no minimum tax is
imposed. In general, this is in the taxpayer's favor; however, care should be
taken to ensure that, in particular circumstances, such treatment does in
fact produce the best overall results.
as MEMBERS o1-".FIE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. COMMENTS RE.: 75:11365 (April 30, 1975). These comments
were a composite of the individual views of the members and are in no way to be construed as
representing the position of the American Bar Association or its Section of Taxation or any
Committee thereof.
5" I.R.C.	 § 348(b)(1) excepts any amount to which these sections apply: 	 72(m)(5),
402(a)(2), 402(e), 403(a)(2), 408(0(2), 408(e)(3), 408(e)(4), 408(e)(5), 408(1), or 409(c).
51 I.R.C. § 170(b).
52
 1.R.C. § 47(a)(9)(A).
52 I.R.C. § 56(a).
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Effect of State Law. The implication of applicable state law must not
be overlooked. A state's income tax law may not yet have reference to the
Internal Revenue Code as amended by the 1976 Act. If, for example, a
state's income tax law followed the Internal Revenue Code as it existed on
January 1, 1971, a lump sum distribution might be treated entirely as capi-
tal gain for state income tax purposes. Accordingly, a taxpayer choosing a
lump sum for federal purposes would be taxed, on his or her state return,
at the capital gains rate on the entire amount, which rate conceivably could
be higher than the ordinary income rate."
B. Reasons to Choose Lump Sum
As a rule of thumb, income tax relief is usually preferable to estate
tax relief, in view of the relative tax rates, and because the unified credit."
and the marital deduction" shelter many estates entirely from estate tax.
Other benefits associated with lump sum treatment are these:
1. Death Benefit Exclusion
When measuring the advantages of a lump sum against those of the
estate tax exclusion, one must consider not just the income tax saved under
section 402, but also the value of being able to exclude a death benefit of
up to $5000. Any amount that was nonforfeitable by an individual at his or
her death is excludible under section 101(b) only if it is paid as a lump sum
distribution from a qualified or section 403(b)
2. Deduction for Estate Tax on Income in Respect of a Decedent
Similarly, the financial effect of a lump sum must be considered in
conjunction with the availability of a deduction under section 691(c) in re-
spect of any estate tax paid on plan distributions characterized as income in
respect of a decedent."
54 Massachusetts has recently updated its income tax law to correlate with the Internal
Revenue Code as amended on May 23, 1977. MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 62, 4 1(c) (West Supp.
1977). Prior to this amendment, however, section 1(c) was referenced to the 1971 Internal
Revenue Code and all lump sum distributions were treated as capital gain.
It remains problematic whether a lump sum, to the extent it is favorably taxed at the
federal level, must be unfavorably treated at the state level. In a recent case, it was held that
the capital gains portion may not be taxed at the higher rate, because it is part of a distribu-
tion that constitutes a single unit arising in an employment setting. Frank E. and Estate of
Anne I. Daley v. State Tax Commission, No. 80901 (Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board, Feb-
ruary 3, 1978) (unpublished opinion). Bat see 78-1 (Ian. 1978). *The Daley ruling is pre-
send}, being appealed by the Massachusetts Department of Corporations and Taxation.
I.R.C. § 2505.
5" 1.R.C, 14 2056.
" I.R.C. § 101(h)(2)(3). Note that I.R.C. § 101(b)(3) makes this exclusion unavailable to
the self-employed and that I.R.C. I 0 1(b)(2)(B) omits mention of IRAs.
5" Payments made arc often "in respect of a decedent" to the extent that the decedent
would have been required to include it in income had he or she survived to receive it. See M.
FERGUSON. 1 FREELAND, & R. STEPHENS. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BEN-
EFICIARIES 170-78 (1970), Supp. 62-64 (1977).
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3. Employer Securities Not Taxed
Under section 402(e)(4)(J) and Regulation § 1.402(a)-1(b)(1)(A), tax
deferral is afforded to that part of a section 402(e)(4)(A) lump sum distri-
bution consisting of net unrealized appreciation of employer securities.
Such amounts will not be taxed until the eventual disposition of the se-
curities. When such securities are not part of a qualified lump sum, tax is
deferred only on that part of the appreciation attributable to an employee's
own contributions.
4. Effect on Adjusted Gross Income
The deduction of the ordinary income portion afforded by section
402(e)(3) reduces adjusted gross income, and makes the "medical deduc-
tion" easier to attain, because in order to be deductible, section 213(a) de-
mands that medical care and medically-related expenses exceed specified
percentages of adjusted gross income.
5. Effect of State Estate Tax
Since many states base their own estate tax system on the Internal
Revenue Code as it existed at a particular date, 59 it will be necessary for
these states to amend the operative date clause of such provisions if lump
sums are to be denied preferential estate tax treatment. In the absence of
such amendment, lump sum distributions will probably still qualify for es-
tate tax exclusion at the state level.
IV AN APPROACH TO ESTATE PLANNING AND QUALIFIED PLAN DESIGN
The estate planner must be careful to extract from his or her client
complete information about membership under qualified plans and should
review any oustanding beneficiary designations on file with the client's em-
ployer and former employers.
It is a truism that the choice of a beneficiary of plan proceeds should
not be entirely, or even primarily, dictated by tax results." One aspect of
the new tax law that may legitimately influence the naming of a beneficiary
is that regardless of whether the participant, the beneficiary, or a plan
fiduciary is resonsible under the plan for choosing the form of distribution, it
is the "taxpayer" who is charged with making the section 402(e)(4)(B) elec-
tion. It may be wise to put this election in the hands of a sophisticated trus-
tee.
" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 62. § 1(c) (West Supp. 1977).
"" Various aspects of the amended section 2039 are beginning to produce some ingen-
ious arrangements. One such scheme that has been advanced intends to produce a tax advan-
tage by means of splitting the distribution where the trust has been funded by an annuity that
at no time could be amended, transferred or surrendered to the insurer. "rhe theory of fered
in its favor is that the cash surrender value is paid in itistallments and qualities under 1.R.C. §
2039(c) for estate tax exclusion, while the balance, paid in a single sum to a second benefi-
ciary, also qualifies because it was not paid "from a trust which forms part of a plan" and
thereby is not a lump sum distribution within the meaning of' 1.R.C. § 402(e)(4). Proponents or
this arrangement claim that the at-risk portion also could qualify for the life insurance ex-
clusion of 1.R.C. § 101.
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A trustee beneficiary might also be the better choice if it develops that.
it is the lump sum distribution, and not the optional special taxation, that
affects the estate tax exclusion. If so, when it has been decided that the es-
tate tax exclusion is desirable, one obvious way to achieve or approximate a
"total distribution" that is nevertheless riot a section 402(e)(4)(A) lump sum
distribution is to divide the payment between two taxable years of the reci-
pient. If the recipient is a testamentary trust, or a trust that becomes irre-
vocable at the grantor's death, its status is that of a new taxpayer and it is
entitled to elect any fiscal year, pursuant to the provisions of section 441(b).
In contrast, a beneficiary of a new trust would have to accomplish this re-
sult by a change of taxable years, a change which must be approved by the
Commissioner, and it is doubtful that a substantial business purpose for the
change—a requirement of the regulations"—could be established.
The planner is reasonably safe in advising the client, where it is
otherwise appropriate to do so, to have plan proceeds payable to a trustee
under a trust created under the will or otherwise. He or she would be well
served, however, by the addition to the governing instruments of a
spendthrift clause, prohibiting the use of any qualified plan assets for pay-
ment of estate obligations so as to prevent constructive receipt by the estate.
If it is decided that a trustee will be placed in the position of making a
decision to elect a form of payment or a form of taxation, an exculpatory
clause should be considered, against the possibility that the beneficiary of
the plan proceeds or the estate beneficiary claims that the choiee made was
a breach of fiduciary duty owed to him or her.
Like the estate planner, the pension planner also must minimize
fiduciary risk, although in the pension area, elimination of statutory liability
through exculpation has largely been prohibited." The plan instrument.
nevertheless can be structured to reduce the possibility of circumstances in
which a former participant or beneficiary can complain that plan design,
fiduciary choice, or fiduciary advice resulted in a loss or in detrimental tax
treatment. Further, those charged with drafting and running the plan must.
be aware that if' the plan as written or in operation favors the "prohibited
group,"—employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly
compensated 6 3—qualification might be successfully challenged by the
Internal Revenue Service.
Unless the plan provides no opportunity to select among distribution
options, the Plan Administrator will have to describe alternatives, and in-
herent, in that duty is some risk of misstatement. When a plan offers an
election against a "qualified joint and survivor annuity," or an election of
an in-service death benefit for the spouse of a participant who chooses to
" Treas. Reg. § 1.442-1(b), T.D. 7323, 39 F.R. 34409 (1974).
" Exculpatory clauses in respect of Part 4 of Tide I ()I' ERISA are outlawed under
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (Supp. IV 1974). insurance policies and indemnification are not
prohibited, provided the plan does not bear their cost. Id. § I I I0(b); see 1.13, 75 -4 Office of
Employee Benefits Security, U.S. Delft of Labor). In addition, the effect of state law, and the
provisions of existing corporate articles and by-laws should be evaluated before indemnifica-
tion is undertaken.
" I.R.C. 401(0(4) provides that a trust will only qualify if the contributions or benefits
under the related plan do not discriminate in favor of employees who are officers, sharehold-
ers, or highly compensated.
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remain employed after qualifying for early retirement, a specific duty of
disclosure is prescribed." 4
 In such cases, a general description. of the
availability and effect. of the election is required, and the participant must
be told that he or she may request specific information as to the effect of a
qualified joint and survivor annuity on his or her pension payments."
There is no requirement. that a plan provide a potential beneficiary with
this information, and no guidelines have been issued as to the extent and
nature of the disclosure requirement, when the joint and survivor form is
not in issue. For all plans, however, section 102(a)(I) of ERISA provides
that participants and beneficiaries be furnished with a summary plan de-
scription "written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant, and sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to rea-
sonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obli-
gations under the plan."""
There is, therefore, no way to insulate the fiduciary entirely against
all responsibility related to accurate disclosure of distribution forms offered
by a plan. It seems equally clear that the fiduciary's responsibility will usu-
ally stop short of tax planning for the participant or beneficiary, but where
the duty lies is uncertain. There often will be an obligation to advise the
employee that tax advice should be sought when a beneficiary and manner
of distribution are selected. What is necessary in order not to mislead the
participant even to the over-conservative extent of urging unneeded and
expensive tax counselling, will depend on the particular relationship be-
tween the fiduciary and participant, the knowledge of the participant's af-
fairs that can he imputed to the fiduciary, the depth of retirement counsel-
ing offered and whether or not the counselor implies to the participant
that all the issues relating to his or her retirement choices have been
covered.
It is difficult to imagine a fiduciary being held liable for failing to
consider or determine correctly the overall maximum tax savings among all
the parties involved, and almost inconceivable except in special circum-
stances, that he or she might be expected to have the means to discover,
much less evaluate, all the information. Nevertheless, whether or not the
sophistication of the fiduciary, as well as that of the participant, may be
legitimately considered, is still an open question. The relationship of pro-
fessionalism to the "prudent man standard" has been the subject of discus-
sion in connection with a fiduciary's investment responsibility," but no at-
tention has been paid to whether such relationship affects the fiduciary's
general duty to act "solely in the interest of' the participants and benefi-
ciaries."
Fiduciary liability can be kept to a minimum if the plan is drafted to
provide only automatic forms of distribution, or, the problems of disclosure
aside, if the plan leaves all choices to the participant or beneficiary. How-
ever, even when a plan provides for a predetermined form of payment,
"4 I.R.C. § 401(a)(11).
" See id.
6 ' 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (Supp. 1974),
" ERISA section 404(0(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (Supp. IV 1974) sets forth the so-called
"prudent man" rule. See generally Kievan, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ER1SA's Prudent Man
Rule: What Are the Guideposts, 451 or TAx. 152 (1976).
546
LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS
charges might be made that plan 'design favors the group most likely to
benefit from the probable tax consequences of that form of payment. If a
plan were to provide only annuities or installment payments, the accusation
could be made that this discriminated against low-paid people with small
estates, who do not need the estate tax exclusion and otherwise might ben-
efit From being able to receive a lump sum distribution. This charge seems
insubstantial in view of the encouragement under ERISA of the joint and
survivor annuity form as the preferred form in respect of married par-
ticipants, and the acceptance, under the regulations, of a situation in which
an annuity is the only form of distribution available.""
If a plan offered a lump sum only, the discrimination issue should
vanish, since there are no rules against discrimination against the prohibited
group. Instead, any liability could flow only from the disclosure duty in re-
spect of the (e)(4)(B) election, because this is a taxpayer function that a
plan itself can probably not assume, or, as one authority has suggested,
from the plan's violation of the exclusive purpose rule if it could be dem-
onstrated that in opting for administrative convenience, the plan failed to
give primary consideration to the participants' and beneficiaries' best inter-
ests." Another response to such a discrimination charge is that the chance
that a "lump sum only" plan would hurt the recipient is especially remote if
the employee survives to receive the lump sum, since in that case a surpris-
ing amount of flexibility will still be available. In many instances, the
employee will be able to convert a forced lump sum distribution into a de-
ferred lump sum or a deferred annuity by rolling the amount into an IRA
or, if he has self-employment income, into a Keogh Plan. Either would
postpone taxation and would shelter any additional income earned on the
deferred amount. Ultimately, the form and time period of the payment
would depend on which arrangement, Keogh or IRA, had been selected."
The most commonly proposed method of minimizing fiduciary discre-
tion is, of course, maximizing participant discretion. The major disadvant-
age of this approach is that there is little flexibility left for post-mortem
planning if' a participant chooses both the beneficiary and the form of
payment. Moreover, it would seem that if a participant or beneficiary were
aware of the result, under the plan, of his or her failure to make a valid
designation, the plan and fiduciary would be largely protected, provided
" See note 61 supra. Care should be taken to avoid the pitfalls of the Silverman case,
note 19 supra.
" See Sollee, Shaping Qualified Plan Payout Provisions and Use of Rollovers Under New
2039(c), 47 J. of TAX. 4 (1977) (hereinafter Soiled
7" Fur a discussion of rollover options, see Beers, Estate Taxation of Employee Benefits
Under the Tax Ref ikrm Act of 1976, 1977 EXEC. Cowl. 3, 4-8.
On the hypothesis that mere omission to make an I.R.C. 402(e)(4)(B) election will not
operate to preserve a desired tax exclusion, an alternative way to achieve the exclusion for a
single payment is to persuade the employer to eliminate the death benefit under the qualified
plan. A lump sum could be paid de hors the plan to or for the benefit of a surviving spouse or
other nonestate beneficiary. The payment would not need benefit of I.R.C. § 2039(c) because
it would be excludible on other grounds if it were not payable pursuant to a binding agree-
ment and did not constitute an interest owned in whole or in part by the decedent at his or
her date of death. For an examination of various techniques for excluding death benefits that
are not paid from qualified plans, see Margolis, Death-Benefit-Only Plans Create Estate Planning
Opportunities for High Tax-Bracket Executives, 4 EST. PLAN. 282, 283-85 (1977); Treanor,
Employer-provided Widow's Benefit, No Estate Tax but Possible Gift Tax, 47 J. Oi TAX. 34, 35-36
(1977).
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that the disclosure made to the individual were sufficient, and provided
further that the disposition of proceeds were made in a reasonable manner.
At the other extreme, when the manner of distribution is left entirely
to the fiduciary, vulnerability is maximized, and where the tax objectives of
the plan distributee and the estate beneficiary differ, there may be ad-
ditional problems, beginning with whether, and when, the fiduciary may be
considered to be on notice of these facts. At present, there is no experience
under which to evaluate how such a fiduciary is to "discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and their
beneficiaries ...." Nevertheless, there are bound to be situations in which a
strong fiduciary system works best, such as plans which have traditionally
operated under such rule, where fiduciary authority is a significant feature
of the plan as a whole, and where the fiduciary is compensated or indem-
nified to his or her satisfaction. Fiduciary dominance is apt to be appropri-
ate in small professional corporations, or in other closely held corporations
where the principal shareholders or their family members constitute the
plan fiduciary and where the plan architect probably will be the architect of
the principal employees' estate plans.
Most situations would appear to call for a plan design that maximizes
participant discretion and, in default of the participant's choice, relies on
the beneficiary to select a manner of payment, subject to the plan
fiduciary's consent." Appropriate variations may be incorporated, but all
71
 The following is a suggested draft governing the distribution options under a qual-
ified plan. In view of the absence of experience and regulations, the reader should be mindful
of its experimental and tentative nature. It should also be noted that this language con-
templates that the term, "Beneficiary," be defined in the plan as anyone other than the Par-
ticipant entitled to receive a benefit.
Distributions in respect of the death of a Participant or Beneficiary as designated
under this Plan shall be governed by the following procedure ("Participant" shall
include former Participant):
(a) Each Participant shall designate one or more Beneficiaries, including
contingent Beneficiaries, to receive all or part of such Participant's distributable
account in existence under this Plan at the Participant's death. This designation
shall be in writing in such manner as the Plan Administrator shall provide. A
Participant shall also specify therein the time and manner of distribution and
may change or revoke such designation and/or specification at any reasonable
time before payments begin.
(b) The Plan Administrator shall direct the Trustee to apply the amount
standing to the credit of such Participant's account as of the Valuation Date that
coincides with (or if it does not coincide, that immediately precedes) his or her
death, pursuant to the foregoing designation and specification. However:
(i) If the specification is absent or ineffective in whole or in part, the
Plan Administrator shall direct payment in such manner as the Beneficiary
or Beneficiaries shall elect, such election to be subject to the Plan Ad-
ministrator's approval. In default of any such election, the Plan Ad-
ministrator shall choose the form of payment.
(ii) If an authorized Beneficiary does not exist at the time of a Par-
ticipant's death, the Plan Administrator shall direct the Trustee to make
payment in a lump sum or in installments to the Participant's spouse, and
if none, to the Participant's issue by right of representation, and if none, in
a lump sum to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the Par-
ticipant's estate.
(iii) If distribution is begun to a Beneficiary and no valid designa-
tion exists in respect of amounts which remain undistributed at such Bene-
ficiary's death, any such amounts shall be paid to such Beneficiary's estate
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should be within an arrangement. under which the participant retains con-
trol over his or her interest in the plan and can coordinate them with an
estate plan. If the choice falls to the beneficiary with fiduciary approval, the
fiduciary is saved from having to shoulder the entire burden while the
beneficiary has some protection from constructive receipt.
CONCLUSION
Although it has been urged that the estate tax preference be elimi-
nated," Congress, in the 1976 Tax Reform Act, chose a more moderate
course. It extended the tax preference to IRA and Keogh plan proceeds,
while restricting the exclusion to non-lump sum distributions. The full
meaning of the amendment, however, will not be understood until the Ser-
vice provides guidelines for a number of questions engendered by the
Code changes.
Moreover, the trade-off between income and estate tax benefits now
forces trustees and beneficiaries of qualified plans to make sophisticated
decisions as respects plan distribution options. This new complexity neces-
sarily will interject an added set of concerns into the formulations not only
of estate planners, but also of those who construct pension programs.
in a lump sum. If a valid designation exists, but a manner of payment has
not otherwise been provided, the amount shall be paid in a lump sum.
72 See, e.g., U.S. TREASL RI' DEP'T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 365-6,1 (1969);
AMERICAN LAW iNsTrrurc. FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION 15-16 (1969): Gaulialt, The Un-
finished Task of Estate & GPI Taxation, 65 lowA L. REV. 85, 112 (1977).
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